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Does Australia have an “Indo Pacific 
strategy”?
Dr Thomas S. Wilkins
Introduction
The US Depar tment of Defense (DOD) released its long-
awaited Indo Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR) in tandem with the 
IISS-Shangrila Dialogue in Singapore on 1 June 2019.  This IPSR 
appears to subsume or extend the earlier Free and Open Indo Pacific 
(FOIP) strategy (sometimes referred to now as a “vision”) into a 
more comprehensive regional Indo Pacific Strategy (IPS), that is 
anchored in the earlier 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 
2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) documents.  Australia has 
yet to produce an analogous document dedicated to profiling its own 
“Indo Pacific Strategy”, but with the US iteration in view, it is possible 
to construct an plausible image of such a strategy in the Australian 
case by drawing upon various pertinent materials from a range of 
government sources.  Indeed, the notion of an overarching IPs is 
gradually taking shape in Australian strategic thinking, as testified 
to by a variety of official documents, including large portions of the 
2016 Defence White Paper, and especially 2017 Foreign Policy White 
Paper, alongside other policy statements and initiatives, framed in 
the context of analysis and debate undertaken by nationally-based 
strategic commentators. A small case “s” in “Indo Pacific strategy” 
is specifically employed in this paper to distinguish the author’s 
conception from any formally mandated government “Strategy”.
An examination and assessment of a putative Australian IPs is 
important in light of the release of the US Report, which goes some 
way to substituting for the discarded Pivot/Rebalance strategy of 
the previous Administration, in that it brings into relief the context 
in which American allies like Australia must now operate. Indeed, 
whilst an Australia IPs will demonstrate convergences with the US 
version (and Japanese FOIP strategy/vision), it is useful to examine 
both how Canberra will contribute to the American IPS, as well as the 
particular dilemmas it faces as a “middle power” state in the current 
security environment. Since Wesley attests that “Australia will be 
significantly affected by the presence and quality of American grand 
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strategy.”1 Not only this, but such a study is also 
useful to illustrate to key allies and partners 
such as the US, Japan, India, and various South 
East Asian states the current regional strategic 
posture Australia is adopting.
The bases of an Australian “Indo Pacific 
strategy” (IPs)
Scholars and analysts have debated whether 
a medium-sized state with relatively limited 
resource constraints can conceivably articulate 
a “grand strategy”, with the inference that 
this is the prerogative of great powers only. 
Unfor tunately space precludes an in depth 
discussion of “strategy”/ “grand strategy” 
in this shor t Policy Brief (please refer to 
reference below),  but succinctly stated: 
“Grand strategy is the highest level of national 
statecraft that establishes how states, or other 
political units, prioritize and mobilize which 
military, diplomatic, political, economic, and 
other sources of power to ensure what they 
perceive as their interests.”2 Indeed, given the 
vast geographical scope of the Indo Pacific 
(IP) region, and the particular concentration 
that Australia has traditionally assigned to 
“its region”, there may not be too much to 
distinguish any “grand strategy” from an “Indo 
Pacific (regional) strategy” - at the very least 
they will be deeply-interrelated. The closest 
that Australia has come to the former, is the 
2013 “National Security Strategy” (NSS), 
whilst both the 2016 Defence White Paper and 
especially 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper 
evinced a strong Indo Pacific regional focus. 
It is from these two more recent documents 
that the contours of a specific IPs can be best 
discerned since they emphasise the embrace 
1　Michael Wesley, “Australia’s Grand Strategy and the 2016 Defence White Paper,” Security Challenges 12, no. 1 
(2016): 20.
2　Paul van Hooft, “Grand Strategy,” in Oxford Bibliographies (2017), 10.1093/OBO/9780199743292-0218.
3　Allan Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment : Australia in the World since 1942 (Carlton, Vic.: La Trobe University Press, 
2017).
4　Wesley, 20.
of the Indo Pacific construct for determining 
Australia’s strategic posture (set within a “global” 
approach).  Additionally, researchers, such as 
Brewster, have pondered the possibility of a 
sub-regional “Indian Ocean strategy” (IOs) and 
how this would fit into the larger IP concept 
(discussed further below). 
Notwithstanding - such abstract debates and 
semantics aside - the essence of any Australian 
IPs revolves around a number of defining 
principles tied to the worldview championed 
by Canberra.3 Australia’s “vision” of a future 
Indo Pacific security order thus has three 
essential elements that must be borne in mind 
when considering the more specific policies 
and initiatives enumerated below. First, the 
determination to uphold a so-called “Rules Based 
Order” (RBO) based upon common adherence 
to international law, rules, and norms, including 
free and open markets, has long been a central 
pillar of Australian foreign and defence policy, 
and has now taken front stage in the projection 
of its worldview (and now finds expression in 
the US-Japanese FOIP concept; integral to its 
IPs, as discussed below). Second, the desire 
to see the US retain its (military) primacy, and 
large-scale engagement in the region largely 
defines Australia’s overall approach to the Indo 
Pacific (and broader Asia Pacific). As Wesley 
notes “Australian strategic policymaking has 
always been strongly invested in regional 
unipolarity.”4 Ergo, the contents of the American 
IPSR will greatly influence Canberra’s regional 
approach, as will be evident from the following 
discussion. Third, ever-increasing regional 
(Asian) engagement, through trade, security 
ties, and multilateral institutions (which was 
most visibly profiled in the 2012 Australia in the 
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Asian Century White Paper).5 This will account 
for the strong “local” (sub-regional) role that 
Australia plays in South East Asia and the South 
Pacific as part of an IPs, alongside an increasing 
“India-centric” emphasis.
Together, these three overarching principles 
resonate throughout the following discussion 
of some of the key policies and initiatives that 
Canberra has initiated towards realising its 
regional vision and can be said to illustrate a 
putative IPs.
Operationalising an Australian Indo 
Pacific strategy:
In order to implement its IPs, Australian 
fore ign and defence p lanners  a im,  l ike 
the US and Japan, at a holistic approach 
that incorporates security, economics and 
governance issues, and recognises the nexus 
between them. Thus security, defence/military, 
economic, trade, and development/connectivity 
policies form of tapestry of strategic interaction 
with the IP region (thus giving it a flavour of the 
core instruments of “grand strategy”). These 
specific economic and security aspects have 
been thematically discussed by the author in 
‘The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and 
Open Indo-Pacific: Looking at Opportunities for 
Canada and Australia,’ JIIA Policy Brief, (with 
Jonathan Berkshire Miller), and are therefore 
not reiterated here verbatim.6
In Part 1, this Policy Brief now introduces 
four key elements of an Australian IPs: (1) 
The “Indo Pacific” as a geopolitical construct; 
(2) instruments of national “hard power”; (3) 
the US-alliance and; (4) multilateral regional 
organisations.  In Part II it then specifically 
5　Australian Government, White Paper: Australia in the Asian Century (Canberra: Australian Government, 2012).
6　Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Thomas Wilkins, “The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: 
Looking at Opportunities for Canada and Australia,” JIIA Policy Brief, Japan Institute for International Affairs, 25 June 
2019.
7　Rory Medcalf, “In Defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia’s New Strategic Map,” Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 68, no. 4 (2014): 471.
looks at three key sub-regional foci: (5) India; 
(6) South East Asia (SEA); and (7) The South 
Pacific. This list of activities below is by no 
means exhaustive, but rather selected as 
representative of an IPs.
Part I: The pillars of an IPs
(1) First off, Canberra has explicitly identified 
the “Indo Pacific” as a suitable geopolitical 
construct through which to frame its continued 
region engagement. Influential Australian 
figures have long advocated for a refocusing 
on the Indo Pacific, aside from the extant “Asia 
Pacific”, as recognition not only of India’s 
rise to economic and strategic prominence, 
but as a better reflection of the actual region 
Australia itself inhabits at the junction of these 
two great Oceans. It was first introduced in 
the Gillard Government’s 2013 Defence White 
Paper (replacing the term “Asia Pacific” from 
previous iterations). “At its simplest”, according 
to Medcalf, “the Indo-Pacific means recognising 
that the accelerating economic and security 
connections between the Western Pacific 
and the Indian Ocean region are creating a 
single strategic system.”7 It reflects a recasting 
of Australia’s strategic map to reflect the 
tremendous impor tance of the intersection 
of the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans has 
acquired based upon the intense and growing 
trading, diplomatic and strategic flows between 
them.
In itself, the IP is a value-neutral concept, 
which includes all the states in the region 
around an indisputable “Asian core” (even 
if precise geographical descriptors of which 
states it comprise remain fluid around the 
edges). Medcalf states that the “Indo-Pacific 
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is an objective description of Australia’s two-
ocean geography as well as the region in which 
China is rising.”8 The term has been adopted 
by Australian allies and partners, and continues 
to gain currency among regional states. Such 
a reframing of Australia’s regional posture - an 
Indo Pacific “pivot”? - appears to capture the 
real geographical and geopolitical locale that 
Australia inhabits, as well as its chosen strategic 
focus. Naturally, it has a strong maritime 
emphasis due to the importance of trade and 
energy routes passing through the region (Sea 
Lines of Communication), with Australia’s 
Western and Northern coasts overlooking an 
“Indo Pacific Arc”, increasingly identified by 
analysts as the “primary strategic objective” for 
Australian defence strategy.9 Thus, the following 
sections show that the wholescale adoption of 
the Indo Pacific label, reflects more than simply 
a rhetorical shift on the part of Australian policy 
makers.
(2) Second, to be ef fective any Australian 
strategy must be backed by the instruments 
of hard power. This includes all elements 
of state capacity - economic, diplomatic, and 
military. The Australian Foreign Policy White 
Paper states that ‘Australia has a vital interest 
in the strength of the regional economy.’10 And 
the Australian economy appears relatively well-
poised to tap into the opportunities raised by 
India’s continued rise, existing Chinese trade, 
and enhanced investment and connectivity 
opportunities around the region. As a provider 
of raw materials and services it seeks to leverage 
the benefits of increased interaction with 
emerging markets. Diplomatically, Canberra 
takes an out-sized role in regional economic and 
8　Medcalf, 472.
9　Adam Lockyer, “The Future of Australian Defence Strategy,” United Service (Journal of The Royal United Services 
Institute for Defence and Security Studies NSW) 68, no. 4 (2017): 15.
10　Australian Government, 43.
11　Rod Lyon, “Australia, Concentric Circles and Strategic Priorities,” The Strategist , Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, 10 May 2016.
12　Thomas Wilkins, “Re-Assessing Australia’s Intra-Alliance Bargaining Power in the Age of Trump,” Security 
Challenges 15, no. 1 (2019): 9-32.
security forums and is building a wide array of 
closer “strategic partnerships” with states in the 
region.
Lastly, as the security element of regional 
interaction comes to the fore due to increased 
military modernisation and rivalry, Australia has 
worked to enhance its already potent military 
forces and attune its defence strategy to the two 
theatres encompassing the “Indo Pacific Arc” 
and “Melanesian Arcs”, vital to its own nation 
defence, whilst retaining the ability to make 
meaningful contributions to military coalitions 
elsewhere most likely led by its US ally (a 
point of major import in contributing to the 
American IPS).11 “Soft power” instruments, such 
as Australia’s values and reputation as “good 
international citizen” also enter the picture, 
especially under the notions of RBO, and are 
seen in action through economic and security 
activities in service of the FOIP.
(3) An Australian IPs is firmly anchored in 
its bilateral alliance relationship with the 
US, and thus as an adjunct to Washington’s 
IPS. Canberra has always been determined 
to play a resolute role in the broader US “hub 
and spokes” alliance system, and support the 
American primacy that upholds the regional 
RBO. In order to ensure the regional balance of 
power favours the US and its allies, Australia has 
sought to increase its defence budget (“burden 
sharing”) and contributions to ANZUS, through 
the hosting of “rotational” US Marine and Air 
deployments in its Northern Territories (Force 
Posture Initiatives) to enhance joint integration 
of training and force interoperability for multi-
domain operations.12 How far Australia has 
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thought about what it is willing and able to do 
to support the US in any regional conflict (e.g. 
Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the 
Global Commons (JAM-GC)), or in support 
of the RBO, is unclear however, yet bilateral 
and minilateral/multilateral exercises such 
as Talisman Sabre and Kakadu give some 
indication of such contingency planning.
It has also supported US ef forts to better 
connect its security relationships in the region 
through multiple partnerships and participation 
in minilateral security groupings such as the 
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD), with Japan, 
and “Quad” (with the addition of India). It has 
played its part in “networking” the US allies 
together (as emphasised as “networked security 
architecture” and “intra-Asian relationships” in 
the IPSR).13 Lastly, through Australia has not 
of ficially endorsed the FOIP label (referring 
instead to an “open, inclusive and prosperous 
Indo-Pacific”14), it basically adheres to its 
guiding principles as outlined explicitly by the 
US and Japan.  The principles of respect for 
sovereignty, peaceful dispute resolution, free, 
fair and reciprocal trade based upon open and 
transparent arrangements, and the adhesion to 
international law, rules and norms (including 
freedom of navigation and over flight) are 
all endorsed by the Australian government 
throughout various documents and statements.15
(4) Also integral to Australian engagement with 
the Indo Pacific is its participation in the full 
range of regional multinational institutions. 
Canberra has continued to pursue its foreign 
policy strategy through such organisations, 
especially those related to ASEAN, such as the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asian 
13　The United States Department of Defense, “Introduction,” in Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, 
Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region (The United States Department of Defense, 2019).
14　Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Canberra: 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017).
15　The United States Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting 
a Networked Region (The United States Department of Defense, 2019), p. 4.
16　Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” 23 June 2019, p. 2.
Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Defence Ministers 
Meeting Plus (ADMM+) among others. This 
is part of an Australian desire to accord with 
the notion of “ASEAN centrality” among its key 
SEA partners (see below), and illustrated by 
the Australia-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic 
Par tnership and the 2018 Australia-ASEAN 
Special Summit.  ASEAN recently released its 
own response to the intensifying debates around 
the IP construct entitled “ASEAN Outlook on 
the Indo Pacific”, including a range of activities 
which might loosely be termed a “strategy”, and 
some of which complement Australian goals, at 
its annual summit meeting in Bangkok in June 
2019. It now adopts “A perspective of viewing 
the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, not 
as contiguous territorial spaces but as a closely 
integrated and interconnected region, with 
ASEAN playing a central and strategic role.”16 
This accords well with Australian perspectives 
a p p e r t a i n i n g  t o  r e g i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
architecture.
Moreover, the extension of the Indo Pacific 
region to encompass the Indian Ocean more 
fully than the previous “Asia Pacific” focus 
necessities greater attention toward the regional 
architecture there. As such, the Indian Ocean 
Rim Association (IORA) looms the large as 
the only (almost) pan-regional organisation. 
This is an avenue for engaging India (see 
below), but also through which to incubate 
a greater regional consciousness among the 
Indian Ocean states. Canberra has invested 
in trying to strengthen the grouping to build 
its effectiveness in addressing pressing issues 
such maritime security, the blue water economy, 
and women’s empowerment, with a dedicated 
Action Plan 2017-21 setting out a road map for 
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future initiatives, including Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA) and counter-ter rorism 
cooperation as well.17
But, as Brewster points out, IORA’s capacities 
are currently uneven and limited at present, 
with much work remaining to be done if it is to 
achieve its potential as an instrument through 
to uphold international norms in the region.18 
Likewise, improved interaction with the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) - in which Australia holds observer 
status - the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-
Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation 
(BIMSTEC), and the Indian Ocean Naval 
Symposium (IONS), is aimed at boosting 
regional economic and security governance.
Part II: Sub-regional foci of Australia’s 
IPs:
This second part shines a spotlight on three 
specific sub-regions upon which Canberra 
has more recently devoted priority attention. 
Canberra remains naturally concerned with 
the deteriorating security situation in North 
East Asia, especially the North Korean nuclear 
challenge and maritime/territorial disputes, as 
articulated in the defence and foreign policy 
white papers cited above. But India, SEA, and 
the South Pacific have all drawn substantial 
attention under a IPs-related agenda, as indicted 
by the shift towards a more expansive IP 
concept itself, which extends the scope beyond 
the traditional policy concerns of East Asia, and 
which undoubtedly retain great importance 
among strategic thinkers in Australia. 
17　Gurpreet Khurana, “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: From Tentative Collaboration to Effective Architecture,” 
Journal of Indian Ocean Rim Studies 1, no. 2 (2018): 9-25.
18　David Brewster, “Australia’s Second Sea: Facing Our Multipolar Future in the Indian Ocean,” Special Report , 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 19 March 2019, pp. 48-50.
19　Peter N Varghese AO, An India Economic Strategy to 2035: Navigating from Potential to Delivery (Canberra: 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018).
20　Ryosuke Hanada, “The Role of U.S.-Japan-Australia-India Cooperation, or the ‘Quad’ in FOIP: A Policy Coordination 
Mechanism for a Rules-Based Order,” CSIS Strategic Japan 2019 Working Papers.
(5) India thus assumes a prominent place in 
Indo Pacific strategizing for Canberra, which 
seeks to reinvigorate its amicable but heretofore 
under-developed bilateral relations with an 
emerging great power with which its shares an 
array of common valued and shared interests. 
The Australia-India Strategic Par tnership 
enunciated in 2009 was revitalised in 2014 by 
Prime ministerial summits aimed at deepening 
political, economic and security ties. Currently, 
the two engage in a 2+2 Foreign and Defence 
Secretaries’ Dialogue to coordinate their views 
on regional issues, and have agreed to work 
toward a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement to boost underperforming bilateral 
trade levels.19
Additionally, the 2009 Joint Declaration on 
Security Cooperation (JDSC) ser ves as the 
backdrop for Annual Defence Policy Talks and 
an annual 1.5 Track Defence Strategic Dialogue, 
which together superintend an expanding 
network of defence and militar y-to-militar y 
ties. The biannual AUSINDEX naval exercises 
are another avenue for strengthening military-
defence ties. Australia shares with India a desire 
to address pressing maritime security issues, 
including MDA, and improve naval cooperation 
against disruptive actions by other states. Lastly, 
Canberra has been a keen advocate of drawing 
India into the larger FOIP vision through 
means of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 
(“Quad”), alongside the US and Japan, in order 
to coordinate response to challenges to the 
RBO in the Indo Pacific.20 As an ancillary to this 
Australia also has a trilateral dialogue with India 
and Japan separately.  For all these reasons, 
India occupies a central place in any conception 
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of a cohesive IPs. Yet Brewster argues that a 
potential “Indian Ocean strategy” as a sub-set of 
an IPs, must not be limited to India exclusively 
in order to seek opportunities with other states, 
with Sri Lanka presented a prime example 
of what might be achieved through capacity-
building assistance and maritime cooperation.21
(6) Closer to home are the maritime and 
peninsular states of SEA with which Australia 
is a major trading partner, as reflected by a 
number of bilateral FTAs (Singapore, Thailand, 
Malaysia) and progress toward an ASEAN-
Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement 
(AANZFTA), as well as participation in Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). 
Moreover, SEA is crucial to Australian defence 
strategy as the “Indo Pacific arc” that represents 
the country’s northern approaches, and where 
several SEA states are embroiled in the thorny 
maritime territorial dispute with China in the 
crucial waterway of the South China Sea. As 
the government identifies “Southeast Asia sits 
at a nexus of strategic competition in the Indo-
Pacific.”22 Space precludes a through discussion 
of the entire ASEAN region, but several 
important developments will be touched on 
here. 
Defence ties with Malaysia and Singapore 
through the Five Power Defence Arrangement 
(FPDA) endure (and may be enhanced as the 
UK seeks to play a stronger defence role in 
the Indo Pacific). Additionally, Canberra has 
just announced a Strategic Partnership with 
Vietnam, and the Strategic Partnership with 
Singapore has been augmented in recent years, 
alongside others. In this respect, Australia - as 
“southern anchor” of the US alliance system - 
21　Brewster, 21.
22　Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 43.
23　Leo Suryadinata, “Indonesia and Its Stance on the ‘Indo-Pacific’,” Perspective, Yusof Ishak Institute, no. 66 (2018): 
1-7. 
24　Australian Government Department of Defence, “Indo-Pacific Endeavour, 2019,” 3 May 2019,  
<https://sldinfo.com/2019/05/indo-pacific-endeavour-2019-2>.
25　Cameron Stewart, “Australia ‘alerted the US’ to China’s Pacific threat,” Weekend Australian, 1 June 2019, p. 9.
serves as a “regional hub” through which to link 
together key states into a local-regional maritime 
security front. Notably, relations with Jakarta 
have improved as the country has sought to 
put forward its own vision as a “global maritime 
fulcrum” in response to the FOIP.23 Australia 
has also supplied capacity-building assistance 
to SEA states that require it, including counter-
terrorism cooperation with the Philippines. 
While the Royal  Austral ian Navy (RAN) 
performs low-key FONOPS under Operation 
Gateway, a flagship part of regional engagement 
is  the Indo Paci f ic  Endeavour  exercise 
which aims at public diplomacy and building 
interoperability as it cruises the Western Pacific 
(and Indian Ocean) to make port calls at several 
SEA states (and Sri Lanka) in its 2019 iteration.24 
SEA will remain central to both the economic 
and security aspects of an IPs.
(7) Final ly,  Canber ra has ramped-up i ts 
policy-attention towards the Pacific Islands 
Countries (PICS) - an area where challenges 
to regional stability have multiplied.  Within 
the broader context of a FOIP-based regional 
order, Canberra has become alert to inroads 
made by the PRC through economic and 
infrastructure development initiatives seeking 
to acquire strategic purchase in Australia’s near 
neighbourhood. Interestingly, former White 
House strategist Steve Bannon credits Australia 
as providing a “wake up call” for Chinese 
infiltration into this region.25 This is alarming 
to Canberra as any hostile presence in the vital 
“Melanesian arc” of national defence (such as 
a Chinese naval port access), would present a 
serious threat to Australian interests. 
But the objectives of the new “Pacific Step 
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up” policy toward this region are double-
edged. 26 On the one hand,  they seek to 
reasser t Australian influence in the South 
Pacific as a counterpoint to China, alongside 
FOIP partners such as the US, Japan and New 
Zealand (which launched its own “Pacific Reset” 
policy).27 This dovetails with the US intent of 
“revitalising its engagement with the Pacific 
islands to preserve a free and open Indo Pacific 
region.”28 The supply of development aid and 
infrastructure investment is designed to prevent 
the PICS falling into dependence upon China 
(including “debt-trap diplomacy” style predatory 
economics), whereas capacity-building such as 
the provision of patrol boats and coast guard 
training is aimed at protecting infringement to 
their sovereign rights (such as illegal fishing/
resource extraction). The planned joint naval 
facility with the US at Manus Island in Papua 
New Guinea (PNG) is the sharpest evidence of 
strategic competition in this new arena. 
On the other hand, it is part of a long-standing 
programme to improve their national resiliency 
through Overseas Development Assistance 
(ODA) by addressing the development, security 
and governance needs of these “fragile states”, 
which could form a potential source of non-
traditional security threats such as people 
smuggling, dr ug traf ficking or ter rorism 
injurious to Australian national security.  This 
has compelled the government of Australia 
to take the real concerns of the PICS about 
the negative repercussions of climate change 
and natural disasters into account, quite aside 
from incipient internal or external political 
challenges (as reflected in the Boe Declaration 
by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)).29 Thus, 
26　Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Stepping Up Australia’s Pacific Engagement,” 
<https://dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement> [Accessed 10 March 2019].
27　New Zealand Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Strategic Intentions (Wellington: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018).
28　The United States Department of Defense, 40.
29　Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “Boe Declaration on Regional Security,” <https://www.forumsec.org/boe-
declaration-on-regional-security> [Accessed 15 July 2019].
30　Hooft.
one observes a clear nexus between economic 
and security imperatives in the Australian local 
strategy towards the South Pacific.
Conclusion/Assessment
Whether the IPs in anyway amounts to a 
representation of (or part of) a fully coherent 
Australian “grand strategy” is debatable, 
as often the boundaries between the use of 
the concept are blurred, and frequently just 
substituted with various aspects of foreign and 
security policy, more generally. And, as noted 
in the introduction, “Middle or smaller powers 
are often implicitly or explicitly assumed to be 
too constrained to pursue grand strategies.”30 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Canberra 
is taking an active role in seeking to shape the 
Indo Pacific region (especially) in its national 
strategic interests in an increasingly competitive 
environment through the various inter-related 
and interlocking initiatives documented above, 
and that it closely dovetails with the mainstays of 
the US version enunciated in the IPSR. Indeed, 
the US statement of intent will be likely well-
received in Canberra, which has fretted over 
the abandonment of the “pivot” and the lack of 
strategic direction in the region evident in the 
first two years of the Trump Administration. As 
this Policy Brief has demonstrated, based upon 
the enduring world view of Australia (RBO; US-
alliance; Asian engagement) the elements of a 
more directed IPs can be discerned throughout 
the related policy initiatives and sub-regional 
concentrations illustrated above. Australia 
therefore clearly seeks to exert its own strategic 
influence upon the IP region as far as its 
resources will allow, augmenting them where 
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possible through cooperation with key allies and 
partners such as the US, Japan, India and key 
states in SEA and the South Pacific.
